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Spain will hold a new general election on 26 June, following the failure to form a government after
the previous election in December last year. Anwen Elias assesses how the issue of Catalan
independence has played out against the backdrop of the country’s political deadlock. She writes
that the independence process risks being derailed by internal divisions within the Catalan
government and a lack of public support for secession, but that demands for self-government
across Spain are unlikely to disappear regardless of the result in June.
In Catalan elections held on the 27 September 2015, pro-independence parties won a majority of
seats in the Catalan Parliament. Claiming a “democratic mandate” to transform Catalonia into an independent state,
on 9 November a process was launched to separate Catalonia from Spain. Some even talked of completing the
work within 18 months. But just over six months on, how much closer is Catalonia to independence?
The obstacles to independence
One of the priorities for the Catalan government
during this period has been to put in place the
“structures of state” that a future independent
Catalonia will need. There has been some progress
on this front. For example, the proposed conversion
of the Institut Català de Finances (a publically funded
institution providing corporate ﬁnancing) is nearing
completion. And the recent restructuring and
expansion of the Agència Tributària de Catalunya
(the Catalan tax agency responsible for collecting
local and autonomous taxes) was widely interpreted
as a step towards the creation of an independent
Catalan treasury.
But there are four reasons why further progress
towards Catalan independence is unlikely to be either
smooth or swift. Firstly, the Catalan pro-
independence government is struggling to contain
ideological and strategic diﬀerences between its
members, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and
Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP). These diﬀerences put the coalition government in an extremely precarious
position. There is disagreement, for example, on the kind of independence that Catalonia should aspire to. Whilst
CDC and ERC are committed to a future Catalan state being a part of the European Union, the CUP is radically
opposed to what it sees as a capitalist European project.
More immediately problematic are diﬀerent views on how to proceed towards independence. The CUP is strongly in
favour of a unilateral “rupture” from Spain once the ‘process’ has run its 18 month course, whilst ERC, and
especially CDC, are reluctant to commit to a ﬁxed timescale for secession.
And then there are the fundamental diﬀerences on socio-economic issues. CUP is a revolutionary anti-capitalist
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party; ERC is a social democratic party; and CDC is a centrist/centre-right party. In other circumstances, where
constitutional issues did not predominate, these parties would not be in coalition together. Finding common ground
on issues such as the forthcoming budget is going to be extremely challenging.
Secondly, there is no majority support for independence in Catalonia. Although pro-independence parties won a
majority of the seats in the Catalan parliament after the September 2015 election, they did so on the basis of having
received only 48% of the popular vote. Opinion polls show that support for Catalan independence is also in decline.
The most recent survey from the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (March 2016) found this to be the preferred
constitutional option of 38.5% of respondents. Any attempt to proceed with secession in such a climate of public
opinion will inevitably (and rightly) be seen as illegitimate within and outside Spain.
Thirdly, there is no consensus within Spain on how to respond to the Catalan independence process. Among
Spanish state-wide parties, for example, positions vary hugely and reﬂect very diﬀerent ideological and strategic
priorities. At one extreme, the right-wing Partido Popular has refused to agree to an independence referendum or
consider any kind of increase in Catalan self-government because of an ideological commitment to the unity of the
Spanish nation.
At the other extreme, the anti-austerity party Podemos has supported holding a referendum on independence in an
attempt to win electoral support among left-wing pro-independence voters in Catalonia, but also the Basque Country
and Galicia. In between these two positions, the Spanish socialists (PSOE) are formally committed to a federal
Spain, but are extremely ambiguous on what this would mean in practice because there are internal divisions over
the issue. Ciudadanos, a new centre-right party, has committed itself to limited tinkering to and clariﬁcation of the
current model of territorial autonomy.
There are also diﬀerences between nationalist parties, as well as between autonomous communities. The Partido
Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party), which (along with its Catalan counterparts) has historically been a
key actor in centre-periphery dynamics in Spain, has explicitly rejected independence as its immediate goal,
preferring to focus on the full implementation of Basque autonomy within the existing legal framework.
There are smaller parties that support Basque independence, but popular support for independence remains
relatively low at around 20%. In other parts of Spain, some autonomous communities consider that the process of
decentralisation has already gone far enough, and would oppose any eﬀorts to enhance existing autonomy
provisions. So there is no uniﬁed front of regional actors challenging the state’s political authority. Rather, there is a
highly heterogeneous collection of territorial interests reﬂecting the very diﬀerent economic, cultural, social and
political proﬁle of diﬀerent autonomous communities.
Fourthly, the fragmentation of the Spanish political landscape in recent years has hindered any serious discussion of
the broader principles underpinning the territorial organisation of the Spanish state, and Catalonia’s place within any
such territorial model. This fragmentation is the consequence of a deep and enduring economic crisis, and a political
crisis characterised by widespread distrust of the country’s political institutions and actors. As a result, many
established political parties have lost electoral support and government oﬃce to new and previously marginal
political actors advocating a radically diﬀerent way of doing and talking about politics.
The issue of Catalan independence isn’t the only casualty of the transformed political landscape. On 26 June, Spain
will hold its second general election within six months because of the failure to form a central government the ﬁrst
time round. Such instability gives little conﬁdence that a negotiated solution to the Catalan question, one that can
satisfy a suﬃcient majority of parties and citizens within and beyond Catalonia, is likely any time soon.
Demands for constitutional change will not go away
Pro-independence parties in Catalonia may have begun to prepare the way for Catalonia to separate from Spain,
but as things stand the prospects for Catalan independence are bleak. On the one hand, the independence process
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risks being derailed by deep-rooted internal divisions within the Catalan government and the lack of public support
for secession. On the other hand, the Spanish political class are unable, or unwilling, to oﬀer credible alternatives to
independence.
Catalonia and Spain are in a stalemate, with no clear way out of a territorial crisis that threatens the integrity of the
state. But the crisis is underpinned by a much more widespread dissatisfaction with the way in which diﬀerent
territorial identities and interests are represented within and managed by the state. Catalan independence is unlikely
to happen any time soon, but neither will the demands for more eﬀective self-government disappear. Spain’s
territorial crisis is here to stay.
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